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Testimony in Favor of SB392 |
Sb392 testimony
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Senate Education, Health and
Environmental Affairs Committee
SB392 Bill Hearing
Thursday, February 22, 2007
Written Testimony by Shazia N. Anwar, Director, TrueVoteMD
Distinguished Senators,
My name is Shazia N. Anwar, and I am the Director of TrueVoteMD, a
statewide election integrity organization with over 3000 members. I am
here today to offer testimony in favor of SB392, calling for
implementation by 2008.
My testimony responds to concerns you have heard from opponents to a
voter-verified paper audit trail voting system.
First of all, this bill, and the statewide election integrity movement,
is not asking the State Board of Elections to implement an independent
voter verification system. National computer scientists, security
experts, election integrity activists and every day citizens are asking
for proof that their voting system provides accurate results. The State
Board has yet to positively and proactively prove that our current
voting system produces accurate results. It can’t.
We are asking for a voter-verified paper audit trail voting system that
ensures not only that every voter can verify their vote before casting,
but that the paper records generated will be used to audit the
tabulating machines and ensure that the overall election results are
verified and accurate. This system, which this bill would create, can
be implemented by 2008 with the procurement of a precinct-based optical
scan system.
Paper Ballots
Opponents to a paper audit trail have told you to be very concerned
about the use of paper ballots in future elections for two reasons: 1)
because it does not provide a visually impaired or blind person an
opportunity to verify their ballot; and 2) that it makes a hand count
of the paper ballots the official tally even though hand counting is
less accurate than a machine count.
While it is technically true that a blind or visually impaired
individual could not verify a paper ballot on their own, discounting
the use of paper for this reason ignores current technology that offers
blind and visually impaired individuals the ability to verify their
vote. Through the use of a ballot-marking device with an audio
component attached, a voter will hear their selections read back to
them before the individual casts his/her vote. The use of paper does
not impede any blind or visually impaired voter from voting on a more
secure verifiable system than is currently available.
As for hand counting the paper ballots, the bill does not claim that
election results will only be reported after a hand count of all votes
cast. The bill states that the initial election results reported from
the optical scan machines will be subject to a 5% audit to ensure that
the machines accurately reported the results. Through a transparent
audit of the paper records, we will confirm that the optical scan
machines worked as expected. Should we discover a discrepancy, the
paper record will be the official record of the votes cast in that
polling place.
The purpose of the paper record is not just to audit the machines, or
provide candidates with the ability to request a recount, but also to
allow the State Board of Elections and every local county board the
ability to resolve problems that might arise through intentional fraud
or accidental mistakes. We currently do not have the ability to address
any type of fraud, machine glitch or even human error that may have
resulted in voter disenfranchisement in our current voting system.
Using paper gives us that critical method.
Federal Paper Trail Activity
(Legislation & Guidelines)
Opponents argue that Maryland should not commit to the optical scan
technology now because it might not meet future federal standards.
Federal activity on the issue, both in Congress and in the Election
Assistance Commission’s upcoming voting system guidelines, are likely
to have little effect on our voting system if we move to optical
scanners under SB392. On the other hand, if current Congressional
legislation is passed, Maryland will most likely be required to change
to a paper audit trail system by the 2008 Presidential election.
In Congress, federal legislation currently introduced would require
that every State produce or require the use of durable, hand-countable
and separate voter-verified paper ballots for the 2008 Presidential
elections. If this bill passes in time for 2008 implementation, and
Maryland does not have a paper audit trail system in place, Maryland
would be out of compliance with this federal legislation unless every
Maryland citizen votes on an absentee ballot. You are right to be
concerned about upcoming Congressional legislation. But this concern
should lead you to pass this bill, not delay it.
As for federal guidelines from the EAC, these draft guidelines for 2009
also mainly address paperless DREs and those DREs that have a paper
component. These two federal level actions would repeal nothing in this
bill. It is unlikely that these two federal activities will affect the
national or statewide use of the optical scan machine as a good paper
audit trail system.
Early Voting
Opponents argue that implementing early voting with a paper audit trail
system will be extremely burdensome. There is no additional burden to
implement early voting with a paper audit trail system than it is for
every local county board of election office to administer in person
absentee voting. Of the 36 states that implement early voting, 13
states use optical scan machines exclusively or in a majority of their
jurisdictions. As the debate over early voting continues, how to
implement early voting within a framework of a voter-verifiable system
should be the question you ask early voting advocates. Early voting
should not be the factor that determines when and to what extent we
implement a more secure voting system in Maryland.
Auditing
The audit provisions in this bill are the most important aspects of the
bill because they ensure that overall election results are accurate.
Providing every voter with a secure way to vote does not necessarily
equal a secure election unless the overall results are also verified.
We’ve all seen the demonstrations on our current machines and their
susceptibility to viruses and computer errors. Our repeated inability
to proactively verify their results is why we must finally make this
change.
The extra time and effort it would take to conduct an audit should be
compared with the need to produce accurate and verified results. The
audit provisions of this bill do not preclude the announcement of the
initial results. But the certification of the election cannot occur
until the audit is conducted and discrepancies are addressed. There is
no steadfast rule as to how long an audit would take. Factors such as
ballot styles and the number of voters in each randomly selected
precinct will affect the length of the initial audit. Using a machine
to conduct the audit begs the question of how do we ensure that the
second layer of technology is working accurately? The audit provisions
are one of the main reasons we are all here today to support this bill.
Complaints about delays in certification of the Primary and its
possible delaying affect on the General Election are moot in the coming
year, since it is a Presidential election year and our Primary will be
held in March. You could not ask for a more perfect time to make a
voting system change. Because it is a Presidential election year, you
will have more than seven months between the Primary and the General
Election to finalize the new system. This gives the State and local
election boards ample time to complete procurement and prepare for the
General Elections with a voting system with which they are all
familiar.
Besides, we are no strangers to delays. Montgomery County delayed
reporting their Primary results because of the large number of
provisional ballots cast thanks to the e-poll books fiasco this past
September. And in large counties such as Montgomery and Prince
George’s, local boards had to hire a large number of temporary staff
persons to canvass the unexpectedly immense number of absentee ballots
cast in November.
These complaints about delays show a resistance to accountability that
we have heard before but refuse to become accustomed to. Part of the
process of implementing an election is verifying its accuracy. An audit
is essential to show the voters that the machines are accurately
reporting the results. This improvement in voter confidence will bring
Maryland citizens back to the polls in droves.
State Board Compromise - Choose
Between Machine and Paper
After objecting to certain provisions in SB392, and dismissing public
outcry for a more secure voting system, State Election Administrator
Ms. Linda Lamone proposed a compromise when she testified in front of
this Committee on SB63 in the hopes of delaying the implementation of a
voter-verified paper audit trail system. TrueVoteMD hopes that the
Committee rejects these so-called proposals outright for the following
reasons.
One proposal includes having op scan ballots available to any voter who
wants to cast a ballot on paper during all 2007 and 2008 elections.
This statement has been clarified to mean that the State Board will
offer paper ballots to voters at the polling place, but that these
paper ballots would be counted at a central location after the initial
machine results are reported. In other words, the State Board has
proposed that all voters that want to use a paper ballot cast a
provisional ballot at their polling site. This so-called solution is
unacceptable because of past experience.
In 2004, hundreds of voters went to the polls and requested a
provisional ballot in order to protest the use of the machines.
TrueVoteMD received dozens of calls from voters who learned after the
appeal deadline that their provisional ballot was rejected and never
counted. As you may know, there are several explicitly articulated
reasons why a voter will be issued a provisional ballot. Protesting the
machines is not one of those reasons. Precedent has thus been set that
anyone issued a provisional ballot in response to expressing their
dismay with the machines will have their provisional ballot rejected
during the canvass.
Secondly, the purpose of the bill is not to give voters a choice to
vote on paper or on an electronic machine. The purpose of the bill is
to ensure that the overall voting system used in Maryland can be and
will be verified accurately, openly and publicly prior to the
certification of the results. This so-called solution offered by the
State Board to Maryland voting citizens does not address the major
concern of our current voting system, namely that there is no way to
proactively prove that the machines accurately recorded and reported
voting results. Allowing individuals to vote on machines that cannot be
verified rejects the very premise of the change.
Because of the voter disenfranchisement that has occurred, and the fact
that the purpose of the bill is to produce a voting system that can be
verified - not simply a system where voters can cast a paper ballot
- TrueVoteMD hopes that this misguided compromise is rejected in
its entirety.
Delay Implementation Until 2010
Opponents are hoping you will wait until 2010 to require the State
Board to procure, certify and implement a more secure voting system.
This delaying tactic has been used before and should also be rejected.
Delays Purchase of Equipment
Expense
One advantage claimed for this delay is that it offsets a $35-$60
million expenditure. Others today will speak about how this number is
highly inflated, based on our current contract with Diebold for optical
scan machines. What you must remember is that we must purchase new
equipment to convert to a more secure voting system. And one of the
cheapest and proven methods of implementing a voter-verified paper
audit trail system is with optical scan machines.
What this request for delay does not acknowledge is that Diebold has
been paid in full for producing machines that are no longer in
compliance with national standards and thus Maryland law. TrueVoteMD
asks that a public inquiry be made into the Diebold contract to review
the potential of getting some of our money back for these machines.
Delays Major Change
Implementation
Opponents claim a delay is necessary to give the State and local
election officials a reasonable time to implement a major voting system
change. Using optical scan machines is not a major voting system
change, as 19 out of our 24 jurisdictions used optical scan machines
prior to the switch to our current voting system. Every jurisdiction
already uses optical scan machines to count absentee ballots. We
currently have a year and half to be ready for the General Election.
This is more than enough time to make this change.
To show you some examples of jurisdictions that have made the change in
less time, last year, 25 out of 169 jurisdictions in Connecticut
changed to an optical scan system between their Primary and General
Election. These jurisdictions used optical scan ballot marking devices
for the disabled community and completed their audit in time to certify
their General Election results by Nov 28th. They intend to implement
the new system for the entire state by their 2007 elections. North
Carolina passed their voter-verified paper audit trail bill in August
of 2005. Nine months later, they used their new optical scan machines
for their May primary with very few problems. Maryland can easily
implement this change in time for 2008.
Delay to Be in Compliance
with New Federal Standards
Opponents argue that delaying implementation will guarantee that we
will be in compliance with any new federal standards. However, the
federal standards contemplated would not affect our paper audit trail
system. As mentioned earlier, if federal legislation is passed as
currently written, it would require us to be in compliance with paper
audit trail requirements for the 2008 Presidential Elections. By acting
now, you are preparing for what Congress is likely to pass. Otherwise,
it is likely that Maryland will have to go into an emergency
legislative session to address how to be compliant by 2008. Let’s make
an effort to be proactive – not reactive.
Delay to Allow New Technology
to Develop
Another advantage claimed with the delay is that it provides time for
the next generation of voting system technology to be developed and
tested. Maryland has had several experiences of being the “beta test
case” for e-voting technology in the past. We are in this current
crisis because we quickly jumped to technology that was not thoroughly
tested, vetted and audited. We do not encourage you to get too excited
about new video technology or other up-and-coming gadgets. We encourage
you to consider a tried and true method for implementing a
voter-verified paper audit trail system. The optical scan system is
used in over 30 states and is what a majority of Americans vote on.
In addition, there is always going to be new voting technology on the
horizon. This does not justify delaying the implementation of this
bill. The purpose of this bill is not to delineate a particular type of
voting technology, but implement good minimum standards by which all
future voting technology apparatus will be tested. These minimums must
be implemented now so that we ensure that our elections next year are
administered on a verifiable system.
Delay to Learn from Other
States
Opponents claim that a delay allows time for us to examine and learn
from the experiences of other jurisdictions that use voter verification
systems. Over 30 states use optical scan machines, 13 of which have
early voting. Forgive me if I don’t understand, but what else is there
to learn? Where was this concern when the State Board implemented the
e-poll books this past year? There is no time like the present to learn
from the experiences of other jurisdictions than passing this
legislation now.
Reviews Equals Accuracy
Finally, the State Board consistently states that Maryland’s voting
system has been repeatedly reviewed as one of the most reliable,
accurate, and secure systems in the nation. We encourage members to ask
the State Board for the sources of these reviews.
The reviews that we are aware of all conclude that paperless electronic
voting machines particularly those used in Maryland are not secure and
are a threat to our democracy. These reviews include Dr. Avi Rubin, who
conducted one of the first reports on the machines, and concluded that
they could be easily tampered with. Subsequently, there was the RABA
Report, which concluded that Diebold’s code should be required to be
re-written. Then there is the SAIC report, which, after the public
release of the fully unredacted version, showed over 300 security
problems with our system. There are similar conclusions in the 2005 GAO
Report, the 2005 Carter-Baker Commission on Federal Election Reform,
and the BlackBox Voting Report, co-authored by Harri Hursti, infamous
for the Hursti Hack of Diebold’s optical scan machine. There is
also the Brennan Center Report and Dr. Felton’s Princeton study,
recently updated when they discovered a published photograph of
Diebold’s access key which, when duplicated at a local locksmith,
successfully opened a Diebold voting machine. This does not even
address the certification process that involves a company, Ciber Inc,
that was recently suspended from certifying any new voting systems.
Ciber Inc. certified our current voting system software.
Our current voting machines require more oversight than optical scan
machines, demand our election judges work longer hours on Election Day,
and implement layers upon layers of technology that even current
computer scientists cannot explain with ease. The most fundamental
concern here is that a Maryland citizen who comes out to vote for any
election has their vote accurately counted. That should be
foremost in any legislators mind – not being the forefront of new
technology.
Please pass SB392, call for implementation by 2008, and make it
contingent on securing funding either from the Governor or the federal
government. And let’s get started with using a more secure voting
system in Maryland. Thank you.
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