EXHIBIT-2: History of security vulnerabilities with the Diebold TS machines
EXHIBIT-3: Five Month Lockdown After November 2004 Meltdown
EXHIBIT-4: Machine malfunctions: Zero vote totals, freezes, crashes, mis-calibrations, blank memory cards, battery failures, encoder failures, etc.
EXHIBIT-5: Candidates/races not appearing on ballot.
EXHIBIT-6: Uncertified voting systems in March 2004 primary.
EXHIBIT-7: Use of uncertified voting systems
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EXHIBIT-1: NEW THREATS: The Hursti hack and California’s Re-Testing of Diebold
Independent computer security expert Harry Hursti conducted a series of mock elections/hack demonstrations on Diebold voting machines in Leon County, Florida from July to December 2005.
A. July 4, 2005, The Hursti report, explains how the Hursti Hack is possible and the threat that it poses to all Diebold voting equipment.
B. December 23, 2005, Shortly after the Hursti Hack took place, states like California and Pennsylvania, took measures to check for this vulnerability in their own equipment. In this letter by Linda Lamone she demands that Diebold give her information about what is happening in California.
C. January 5, 2006, Diebold sent a letter to Pennsylvania, in regards to their questions about the Husrti vulnerability. The letter admits that the Diebold-TS voting system we use in Maryland contains the AccuBasic script used for this hack.
D. Federal 2002 standards generally prohibit the use of interpreted code.
E. February 16, 2006, Realizing that the State Board of Election’s was not sharing information about this Hack and the effect on Maryland Governor Ehrlich sent this letter to the SBE, where he says that he no longer has faith in the electoral process.
F. March 2, 2006: An excellent summary of relevant parts of California’s testing of the Diebold touch screen machines and its implications for Maryland by Bob Ferraro of TrueVoteMD. California certified the machines with many conditions. The critical difference between the TS-X used in California and the TS used in Maryland is the former provides an independent paper record verified by the voter, while the Maryland system does not.
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EXHIBIT 2: History of Security Problems With The Diebold Machine
In addition to machine malfunctions, paperless electronic voting is vulnerable to an ever-increasing number of hacks and security breaches.
A. May 17, 2002, Email to Diebold from SBE, listing several security problems with Diebold TS.
B. May 24, 2002, Series of letters between VP of Academic Affairs at U.M.D, and Linda Lamone. An open effort by Linda Lamone to silence criticism by a University of Maryland Professors Usability Review and Op-Ed peace (page 2-3 of Series of letters link).
C. July 23, 2003, Conclusion (page 21) of the well-publicized John Hopkins Report.
D. September 2, 2003, SAIC Report reported over 300 vunerabilities with the AccuVote-TS units.
E. Septeber 22, 2003, SBE Action Plan responce to the SAIC Report came out. On page 7 of this SBE Action Plan, under Tasks and Schedule, #4, it states that the Diebold source code was re-engineered to eliminate hard-coded passwords. California's February 16, 2006 report identified this as still existing on their system more than 2 years later.
F. November 5, 2003, Complaint filed by TrueVoteMD (aka the Campaign for Verifiable Voting) summarizes the concerns that voting integrity activists have with the Diebold paperless voting system. Nearly all of these concerns have yet to be addressed.
G. February 2004. Conclusion of RABA Report (page 23) – major security evaluation commissioned by Maryland’s Department of Legislative Services.
H. Efforts by the SBE to resolve some issues brought up by RABA report. First from January 29, 2004 and then an update from July 22, 2004. You can see the latest update on the SBE website.
I. January 20 2004, Email and portions of paper from Paul Herrnson, on the testing of the touch screen system.
J. March 23, 2005, SBE comparisons of various vote verification methods.
K. Undated Scytl comparison of various vote verification methods. Makes one wonder why they wasted money on the UMBC studies.
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EXHIBIT-3: Five Month Lockdown After November 2004 Meltdown
On March 8, 2005, TrueVoteMD issued a press release reporting that Diebold insiders AND county election officials talked openly about the 'statewide lockdown' of the Diebold voting machines which was imposed election night to allow Diebold to diagnos the various system meltdowns on November 2, 2004. The documents below show that 5 month techncial analysis, about which Lamone lied ot the press. Lamone stopped to lockdown wihtin days after TrueVote's release.
February 9, 2005,
Letter from Montgomery County Root Cause Analysis referring to corrupted audit log files.
February 16, 2005, memo referring to problems of PC card testing being beyond the scope of Diebold employs in Maryland and needing to send problem units back to Diebold for testing.
February 24, 2005, Another reference to corrupted audit log files.
March 10th 2005, letter from Tom Feehan on additional DRE’s sent back to Diebold.
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EXHIBIT 4. Machine Malfunctions: Freezes, Crashes, Miss-Calibrations, Blank Memory Cards, Etc.
A. March 12, 2002, Two memos, where Diebold realizes that they are having serious problems with the motherboards on their TS machines and orders that production be stopped [1]. Also reports screen freezes and crashes will be likely due to defect. [2]
B. May 9, 2002, Montgomey County Encoder Report, which lists a 41% failure rate of the Encoders used in the MCPS Election.
C. February 1, 2004, Diebold Memo to Maryland SBE identifying hardware failures in Montgomery County.
D. March 28, 2004, Letter referring to the need to replace 156 system boards after the primary.
E. Complaints filed by Liberty Rucker and Joyce Ludwig about touch screen failures while in the act of voting, and not being allowed to correct their vote choices. Initial complaint filed November 2, 2004 and documents through March, 23, 2005. Packet includes:
i. January 21,st 2005, Testimony from hearing on complaint.
ii. January 21,st 2005, hearing Response from MD SBE. The SBE admits the possibility of screen calibration as cause of problem.
F. December 29, 2004, Complaint by James Chervenak
i. Copy of initial complaint by Mr. Chervenak filed December 29, 2004
ii. January 7, 2005, Internal Memos from the LBE and SBE in regards to complaint
iii. January 24, 2005 SBE response to Mr. Chervenak’s complaint.
G. December, 2004, Pages from Montgomery County Lessons Learned Report stating that 189 Voting units (7%) deployed on Election Day failed and 122 (5%) others were suspect.
H. December, 2004 County Machine Malfunction reports. Lists of machine failures from after November 2004 elections from 15 of the 23 counties that used the Diebold TS in 2004 General Election, including number of malfunctions per county, and summery of problems.
Summery of Machine Problems by County Breakdown Reported to SBE & Diebold
Anne Arundel, Power problems/ battery problems, screen breakdowns, encoder and smart card problems: 19 machine malfunctions reported.
Cecil, only had one machine malfunction
Charles, where machines would not start up: 6 machine malfunctions reported.
Dorchester, power problems and voter access cards rejected: 14 machine malfunctions reported.
Frederick, all "boot error messages": 7 machine malfunctions reported.
Harford, calibration problems, freezes, not accepting votes, not printing: 28 machine malfunctions reported.
Howard, including PC card problems, machines not turning off: 10 machine malfunctions reported.
Kent, Screen Failure: machine malfunctions reported: 1 machine malfunctions reported.
Prince George, Screen failures, PC card problems: 15 machine malfunctions reported.
Queen Anne’s, would not read voter access card: 1 machine malfunction reported.
St. Mary’s, would not turn on: 3 machine malfunctions reported.
Somerset, "hung unit": 1 machine malfunctions reported.
Washington, not accepting Voter cards: 2 machine malfunctions reported.
Worchester, memory card failures: 2 machine malfunctions reported.
Baltimore County, including machines recording zero votes: 49 machine malfunctions reported.
148- total malfunctions reported
Reports missing from 8 remaining counties, including Montgomery County.
I. November 23, 2004 TrueVoteMD Pollwatching Report “When the Right To Vote Goes Wrong” reported 201 machine failures. See page 16 (see Exhibit 3 for a copy), we recorded a total of 201 problems with the voting machines.
J. Machines have lost votes with blank memory cards and corrupted audit logs.
K. Baltimore County, report of 16 machines with memory card failures where machines recorded 0 votes or much fewer votes than other machines in their precinct.
L. Worchester County reported two machines had memory card failures.
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EXHIBIT 5: Candidates/Races Not Appearing on Ballot
A. March 23, 2004, Letter from Senator Barbara Mikulski to Linda Lamone stating that in the March 2, 2004 primary, constituents from three counties reported to her that the US Senate race was missing from their electronic ballot. This problem was reported in three counties: Montgomery, Anne Arundel and Harford.
B. July 15, 2004, Complaint filed by Mr. Jeffrey Liss, reporting an incomplete ballot in Montgomery County. The Senate race did not appear on his electronic ballot. Six of the 31 blank ballots for the Democratic senate race were cast on the machine that he used.
i. July 15, initial complaint by Mr. Liss.
ii. March 17, 2004, letter from Mr. Liss to Kevin Karpinski Council to County Board of Elections
iii. Liss v Montgomery County Election, Final Determination.
C. March 5, 2004, Liss complaint attachment: a March 2004 primary election summary from Liss’ polling place,ncluding 25% of all Republican Senate Primary votes. 31 blank Democrat Senate Votes.
D. November 2004, Table A from TrueVoteMD's poll watching report for the 2004 General Election. Pollwatchers recorded 8 additional complaints of incomplete ballots similar to the incidents in the primary election. See page 16.
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EXHIBIT 6: Uncertified Voting System in March 2004 Primary.
A. The use of an uncertified voting system violates Maryland election law which states: “The State Board may not certify a voting system unless the State Board determines that . . . the voting system has been . . . shown by the testing laboratory to meet the performance and test standards for electronic voting systems established by the Federal Election Commission.” (See Title 9, Subtitle 1, Section 9-102 entitled Certification of Voting Systems.)
B. According to the NASED (National Association of State Election Directors) website’s official listing of Qualified Voting Systems, the only Diebold AccuVote TS system listed did not receive a qualification number until May 20, 2004, more than two months after the March primary.
There is no record of a waiver of certification by Lamone of this ‘GEMS tabulator’, which tabulates the votes and is thus central to the voting system.
C. On April 30, 2004, California decertified all Diebold voting systems in part because of the use of uncertified software in that state. See Press Release by Kevin Shelley, California Secretary of State. (For background, see Staff Report on Investigation of Diebold 4/20/04)
D. January 17 2006, Pennsylvania moved to de-certifya document dated January 5, 2006 in which Diebold acknowledged that the banned AccuBasic software, which creates the security hole that allows the Hursti Hack is used on memory cards for the TS machines – the machines used in Maryland and Georgia.
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Exhibit 7: Use of Uncertified Voting System in Violation of Maryland Law
This exhibit contains correspondence and other materials discussing the problem of Diebold, Inc. providing uncertified election equipment to Maryland. The equipment was not certified until the May 20, 2004. (There was a March 2004 presidential primary during that time and it appears it was uncertified for 2002 primary and general elections as well.) No documents were provided demonstrating these machines were certified for the 2002 elections. Using uncertified is illegal under Maryland law (See Title 9, Subtitle 1, Section 9-102 entitled Certification of Voting Systems). Web links for these and related letters are included below.
A. December 22, 2003 - February, 13, 2004, Two letters from the SBE to Diebold with complaints that they provided uncertified soft/hardware to the State and that this lack of testing and certification violated the original contract with Diebold. The February letter is a request to Diebold for the SBE to be reimbursed for second tests to be performed by Independent Testing Agency (ITA).
B. February 3, 2004, Waiver of Certification from State Elections Administrator Linda Lamone to Diebold for the encoders for voter access cards and the key card that assigns passwords and keys. The waiver is good through April 16th, 2004.
C. February 27, 2004, Request from Diebold for another waiver of certification, due to an update of their Ballot Station, from v 4.3.15 to v4.3.15C.
D. April 5, 2004, Letter to Diebold from Linda Lamone again requesting the software upgrades from Diebold. On page 2 it specifically refers to Diebold providing unqualified (federally uncertified) software and the need for retesting.
E. April 15, 2004, Dated after the 2004 primary, this letter contains information that on April 5, 2004 the SBE had still not received NASED certified soft/firmware from Diebold.
F. April 26, 2004, Letter from Diebold to Alameda County discussing decertification of the new model TSx in CA. “Diebold Election Systems, Inc. Report of Assurances to Alameda County”.
G. May 4, 2004, Letter to Diebold from Lamone, in which she states that the SBE has not received certification for the voting system.
H. May 5, 2004- Letter from Diebold to Lamone, commenting on the NASED certification. Diebold states: “DESI also will have a certified NASED system for the state of MD implemented prior to the November Election.”
I. June 21, 2004- Letter to Diebold from Lamone
J. December 23, 2004- Letter from Lamone to Diebold in which she cites sections of the contract which Diebold has broken. continuing to state that SBE is withholding payments to Diebold until upgrades passes user acceptance testing.
