|
Friday, Nov. 18, 2005 by Alex Zeese I am pleased to see that Del. Jon S. Cardin has shown concern for election integrity, and I agree that this is one of the most important issues our democracy has faced over the past five years (‘‘Audit the vote from booth to final tally,” Nov. 11 Issues for our times). Delegate Cardin listed three key requirements that the state should consider when crafting legislation on this issue: a transparent system for auditing, a system for an accurate recount and an encrypted paper receipt allowing a voter to verify his vote.
I will not disagree with Delegate Cardin on the first two of his requirements, transparent auditing and recounts; these are vital. However, the ‘‘encrypted receipt” does nothing to get recounts and audits out of the black box and into the light of human observation that we enjoyed for generations. It does nothing for voters’ ability to verify an accurate recording of their vote. Further, it does nothing to protect against computer malfunction that sometimes results in blank or inaccurate ballots.
There is a basic problem with the encrypted receipt system. The way that it works is that a person is given a receipt after voting with a code of numbers and letters. The voter must take that coded receipt and check, by Web or phone, where it will say either ‘‘your vote has — or has not — been tampered with.” It cannot say whom you voted for or else you can have the potential for vote buying.
There are several problems with this approach. What happens when the computer or phone operator tells you that your vote has been tampered with? What if hundreds of thousands find their votes were hacked? Does the whole county or precinct vote again? There is no timely remedy that gets the vote(s) counted accurately.
What if a computer expert figures out a way to alter the vote and alter the encryption software and makes it so they were not caught — a problem repeatedly flagged? Finally, and perhaps most important with this approach, you cannot conduct a recount. If computers make an error due to tampering or due to machine failure resulting in lost votes then there is no independent record with which to conduct a recount.
For our voting system to be worthy of the voters’ confidence, it must be transparent, accurate and secure in every single phase: the marking, counting and auditing of ballots, and when necessary, in recounts.
That is why experts who have studied this issue have consistently recommended that the voting systems in Maryland must include a voter verified paper ballot and audit trail. What this would mean is that a vote would be recorded onto a paper record that is used to do random audits of the machines and a recount of the vote whenever necessary. Why paper? Because it provides an independent record, confirmed by the voter that can be counted transparently and candidates, political parties, the public and the media can witness the recount.
Delegate Cardin seems unaware of problems with voting machines in Maryland in the 2004 elections. In fact, Maryland did have a major voting discrepancy in the 2004 election where in Baltimore County the turnout numbers reported by the county and the state have 6,462 more votes recorded than the voters turned out. This includes absentee and provisional ballots.
Originally the discrepancy was more than 20,000 but that number was revised in September.
There were also several hundred problems related to voting machines in Montgomery County. According to their ‘‘Lessons Learned Report,” 7 percent to 12 percent of voting machines in Montgomery County had serious problems, including screen freezes and machine breakdowns.
Finally, Delegate Cardin stated that paper ballots have a higher error rate than computerized voting. In an October study, ‘‘Beyond the Hanging Chad,” done by the University of Maryland, the results of human error from each different type of voting system ended up being about the same, ranging between 4 percent to 5 percent, with voting error being higher with poor design of the ballot, without regard to the question of paper or electronic ballots.
We all agree that a successful election system is critical to our democracy. No one wants a voting system that is easy to steal, but the real solution, like the devil, is in the details. Public access and understanding is one of the keys to success, if we make a voting system so technically complicated that the average person cannot understand how their political leaders are chosen, how can we expect them to trust the system?
Alex Zeese of Takoma Park is grassroots organizing coordinator of TrueVoteMD, an organization that has campaigned for verifiable voting in the state.
Copyright © 2005 The Gazette - ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Privacy Statement |
