• Overview
• Who is TrueVoteMD?
• What is a VVPB?
• FAQ's
• Myth Breakers (a 70 page report that provides easy access to the facts on verifiable voting)

THE SOLUTION

A Voter-verifiable paper ballot (VVPB) would:

• Allow ALL voters to inspect individual permanent records of their ballots before they are cast
• Allow for meaningful audits and recounts
• Protect election accuracy against computer malfunction, human error and tampering
• Accommodate citizens who require alternative languages
• Ensure accessibility for people with disabilities to an independent and secret ballot.

WHAT IS A VVPB?

A Voter-verified paper ballot (VVPB) is a permanent, paper record of a ballot cast on a direct recording electronic (DRE) -- or touch-screen -- voting machine. It permits a voter to review and correct the choices made on paper before casting a vote that is recorded, filed, and tabulated electronically. This paper, which is kept on file under secure conditions, becomes the official ballot in the even of a discrepancy between the paper and electronic records. It provides an independent check if a recount is necessary and is also used to audit and correct performance errors in the DRE's.

• Paper is a write-once medium: once written, it cannot be erased or rewritten by software (without detection).
• Paper is human readable without special devices or software. If software is needed to read a medium, it leaves open the question of the trustworthiness of that software.
• Paper allows for transparent recount processes that can be observed by candidates, political parties and voters. DRE’s cannot provide a public recount because the counting cannot be observed (it all happens inside a machine).

Leading national computer professionals and security experts have stated clearly that any computer voting system cannot be made completely secure . They have formally recommended that any electronic system have a verifiable paper audit trail as the only way voters can have confidence that their vote has been recorded correctly each time, and that recounts and spot checks are possible. Alarmingly, these recommendations have not been incorporated in the Maryland system.

In the 2004 election, many vote count discrepancies occurred, including:

• In Carteret County , North Carolina , electronic voting machines lost nearly 4,400 votes because the machine software had a ceiling of 3,000 votes. A new state-wide election for the state agriculture commissioner was held, costing nearly $20,000.
• Statewide in New Mexico, 2,087 "phantom"; votes -- that is, 2,087 more votes recorded than the number of ballots cast -- were documented.
• In Gahanna precinct in Franklin County, Ohio, only 638 ballots were cast but 4,258 votes went to one presidential candidate and 260 to the other. Local election officials caught the error, but when asked why it happened, they could not say. 

In Maryland, TrueVoteMD documented over 530 incidents of voting irregularities Nov. 2nd, of which over 200 involved failures of electronic voting machinery and ancillary devices.  Since TrueVoteMD's pollwatchers only covered 6% of the state's 1787 precincts, one can reasonably assume that thousands of voters across the state faced DRE irregularities and breakdowns.